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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of the rise of services in the narrowing of gender gaps
in hours and wages in recent decades. We document the between-industry component of
the rise in female work for the U.S., and propose a model economy with goods, services
and home production, in which women have a comparative advantage in producing
market and home services. The rise of services, driven by structural transformation
and marketization of home production, acts as a gender-biased demand shift raising
womens relative wages and market hours. Quantitatively, the model accounts for an
important share of the observed trends.
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1 Introduction
One of the most remarkable changes in labor markets since World War II is the rise in female
participation in the workforce. In the US, the employment rate of women has more than
doubled from about 35% in 1945 to 77% at the end of the century, and similar trends are
detected in the majority of OECD countries. These developments have generated a vast
literature on the causes, characteristics and consequences of the rise in womens involvement
in the labor market. The existing literature has indicated a number of supply-side explana-
tions for these trends, including human capital investment, medical advances, technological
progress in the household, and the availability of child care, and a recent line of research
emphasizes the role of social norms regarding womens work in shaping the observed decline
in gender inequalities.1
In this paper we propose a novel, and complementary, explanation for the observed trends
in gender outcomes, based on the secular expansion of the service economy and its role in
raising the relative demand for female work. Our emphasis on the evolution of the industry
structure is motivated by a few stylized facts. First, the sustained rise in female work since
the late 1960s in the U.S. has been accompanied by a fall in male work, and a rise in womens
relative wages. In 1968, womens hours were about 37% of mens hours, and their wages
were about 64% of male wages. By 2008, these ratios rose to 74% and 78%, respectively.
Second, the entire (net) rise in womens hours took place in the broad service sector, while
the entire (net) fall in male hours took place in goods-producing sectors, including the
primary sector, manufacturing, construction and utilities. This pattern is closely linked to
the process of structural transformation, and specically the reallocation of labor from goods
to service industries, with an expansion of the services share from 57% in 1968 to 77% in
2008. Finally, the rise in womens hours in the service sector was accompanied by a strong
decline in their working hours in the household, from about 38 to 28 hours weekly, consistent
with substantial marketization of home production.2
Motivated by these facts, this paper studies the role of the rise of the services sector,
in turn driven by structural transformation and marketization, in the evolution of gender
outcomes in hours and wages. The interaction between structural transformation, marketi-
zation and female work has been largely overlooked in the literature. However there are clear
1See Goldin (1990, 2006) for comprehensive overviews of historical trends and their causes. See (among
others) Goldin and Katz (2002) and Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) for the role of medical progress; Greenwood,
Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) for the role of technological progress in the household; Galor and Weil (1996)
and Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) for the role of declining fertility. See nally Fernandez (2011,
2013) and references therein for theory and evidence on cultural factors.
2See also Freeman and Schettkat (2005) and the discussion in Lebergott (1993, chapter 8) on the link
between marketization and consumerism: ... by 1990 [women] increasingly bought the goods and services
they had produced in 1900, and Bridgman (2013), documenting the rise in the ratio of services purchased
relative to home production since the late 1960s.
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reasons why these can contribute to the rise in female market hours. First, the production
of services is relatively less intensive in the use of brawn skills than the production of
goods, and relatively more intensive in the use of brainskills. As men are better endowed
of brawn skills than women, the historical growth in the service sector has created jobs for
which women have a natural comparative advantage (Goldin, 2006, Galor and Weil 1996,
Rendall 2010). While the brawn versus brain distinction has become less relevant in re-
cent decades due to the introduction of brawn-saving technologies, women may still retain a
comparative advantage in services, related to the more intensive use of communication and
interpersonal skills, which cannot be easily automated. The simultaneous presence of pro-
ducer and consumer in the provision of services makes these skills more valuable in services
than goods production, and a few studies have highlighted gender di¤erences in the endow-
ment and use of such traits (Roter et al, 2002, Dickerson and Green, 2004, Borghans et al.,
2005, 2008). Womens comparative advantage in services is clearly reected in the allocation
of womens hours of market work. In 1968, the average working woman was supplying three
quarters of her market time to the service sector, while the average man was supplying only
one half of his market time to it. As structural transformation expands the sector in which
women have a comparative advantage, it has potentially important consequences for the
evolution of womens hours of market work. Indeed, in a shift-share framework, as much as
one third of the rise in female hours took place via the expansion of services, at constant
female intensity within each sector.
The second reason is related to womens involvement in household work. In 1965, women
spent on average 38 hours per week in home production, while men spent 11 hours. Household
work typically includes child care, cleaning, food preparation, and in general activities that
have close substitutes in the market service sector. If the expansion of the service sector
makes it cheaper to outsource these activities, one should expect a reallocation of womens
work from the household to the market. The work allocation of men and women in the late
1960s is thus key to understanding later developments. While women were mostly working
in home production and the service sector, and thus their market hours were boosted by
both structural transformation and marketization, men were predominantly working in the
goods sector, and their working hours mostly bore the burden of de-industrialization.
In our proposed model, market sectors produce commodities (goods and services) that
are poor substitutes for each other in consumer preferences, while the home sector produces
services that are good substitutes to services produced in the market. Production in each
sector involves a combination of male and female work, and females have a comparative
advantage in producing services, both in the market and the home. Labor productivity
growth is uneven,3 reducing both the cost of producing goods, relative to services, and the
3Uneven labor productivity growth can be driven by uneven TFP growth or di¤erent capital intensities
across sectors.
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cost of producing market services, relative to home services. As goods and services are poor
substitutes, faster labor productivity growth in the goods sector reallocates labor from goods
to services, resulting in structural transformation. As market and home services are good
substitutes, slower labor productivity growth in the home sector reallocates hours of work
from the home to market services, resulting in marketization.
The combination of consumer tastes and uneven productivity growth delivers two novel
results. First, due to womens comparative advantage in services, structural transformation
and marketization jointly raise womens relative market hours and wages. In other words,
gender comparative advantages turn a seemingly gender-neutral shock such as the rise in
services into a de facto gender-biased shock. Second, for both men and women, market
hours rise with marketization but fall with structural transformation. Their combination is
thus needed to rationalize observed gender trends: marketization is necessary to deliver the
rise in female market work while structural transformation is necessary to deliver the fall in
male market work.
To quantitatively assess the importance of the mechanisms described, we calibrate our
model economy to the U.S. labor market and predict trends in gender outcomes implied by
observed productivity growth di¤erences. Our baseline calibration predicts the entire rise in
the service share, 20% of the gender convergence in wages, nearly half of the rise in female
market hours and 7% of the fall in male market hours. These predictions are solely due
to between-sector forces, via structural transformation and marketization, while no within-
sector forces are at work. However, we show that introducing within-sector forces such
as gender-biased technical change and accumulation of human capital improve the models
predictions for gender-specic trends, leaving sector-specic predictions unchanged.
There exist extensive literatures that have independently studied the rise in female la-
bor market participation and the rise of services, respectively, but work on the interplay
between the two phenomena is relatively scant. Early work by Reid (1934), Fuchs (1968)
and Lebergott (1993) have suggested links between them, without proposing a unied the-
oretical framework. One notable exception is work by Lee and Wolpin (2009), who show
that the rise in services is empirically important in understanding changes womens wages
and employment. The rise in services in their model is driven by an exogenous shock to the
value of home time, while marketization of home production endogenously a¤ects the value
of home time in our framework.
Our work is also related to Galor and Weil (1996) and Rendall (2010), who illustrate the
consequences of brain-biased technological progress for female employment in a one-sector
model in which females have a comparative advantage in the provision of brain inputs.4 In a
4Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003) and Heathcote et al. (2010) also consider within-sector de-
mand forces and illustrate the rise in the gender hours ratio stemming, respectively, from a fall in gender
discrimination and gender-biased technological progress.
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similar vein, we assume that women have a comparative advantage in producing services in
a model with two market sectors and home production, in which the rise in female market
hours and the share of services are simultaneous outcomes of uneven productivity growth.
Marketization of home services, contributing to both the rise of female market work and the
services share, also features in Akbulut (2011), Buera et al. (2013) and Rendall (2014). Our
main contribution to this strand of literature is to endogenously explain the narrowing of
gender gaps in wages. Finally, the interplay between the service share and female outcomes
has been recently studied in an international perspective by a few papers that relate lower
female employment in Europe to an undersized service sector relative to the U.S. (Rendall,
2014; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2014; Olivetti, 2014).
The recent literature on structural transformation often classies the mechanisms that
drive the rise in services into income e¤ects and relative price e¤ects.5 With the rst mecha-
nism, income growth shifts the allocation of resources towards services as long as the demand
for services is more elastic to income than the demand for goods. With the second mecha-
nism, changes in relative prices alter the resource allocation when the elasticity of substitution
between goods and services is not unity. Both channels are at work in our model, as well
as in Ngai and Pissarides (2008) and Rogerson (2008). Slower productivity growth in ser-
vices raises their relative price, in turn raising the expenditure share on services, as services
and goods are poor substitutes in consumption. Higher income elasticity of services follows
from the assumption that market services are closer substitutes to home services than goods.
Under this assumption, the rise in income driven by faster productivity growth in market
sectors raises the opportunity cost of home production, in turn stimulating the demand for
market services, as these are the closest available substitute to home production.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section documents relevant trends in gender
work and the size of services during 1968-2009, combining data from the Current Population
Survey and several time use surveys. Section 3 develops a model for a three-sector economy
and shows predictions of uneven labor productivity growth for relative wages, market hours
and home production hours. Section 4 presents quantitative results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and stylized facts
We show evidence on the evolution of labor market trends by gender and the service share
using micro data from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) for survey years 1968
to 2009. We also obtain information on hours of home production by combining time use
surveys for 1965 onwards. The key facts emphasized in this section concern the evolution of
5See Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (2013b) for a recent survey, and references therein, including
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), Baumol (1967), Boppart (2011), Buera and Kobaski (2012), Caselli and
Coleman (2001), Kongsamut et al (2001), Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Rogerson (2008).
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market work, wages, and home production.
2.1 Market work
Our CPS sample includes individuals aged 18-65, who are not in full-time education, retired,
or in the military. Annual hours worked in the market are constructed as the product of weeks
worked in the year prior to the survey year and hours worked in the week prior to the survey
week. This hours measure is the only one continuously available since 1968 and comparable
across annual surveys. For employed individuals who did not work during the reference week,
weekly hours are imputed using the average of current hours for individuals of the same sex
in the same year. Until 1975, weeks worked in the previous year are only reported in intervals
(0, 1-13, 14-26, 26-39, 40-47, 48-49, 50-52), and to recode weeks worked during 1968-1975
we use within-interval means obtained from later surveys. These adjustment methods have
been previously applied to the March CPS by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Heathcote et
al. (2010). Our wage concept is represented by hourly earnings, obtained as wage and
salary income in the previous year, divided by annual hours. Survey weights are used in all
calculations.
Figure 1 shows a evidence on market work. Panel A plots annual hours by gender,
obtained as averages across the whole population, including the nonemployed. Female work
rises steadily from about 720 annual hours in 1968 to nearly 1200 hours in the 2000s, while
male hours gradually decline throughout the sample period, from about 1950 to 1600. These
diverging trends imply a doubling of the hours ratio6, from 0.37 to 0.74, and a fairly stable
number of aggregate hours in the economy.
We classify working hours into two broad sectors, which we dene as goods and services.
The goods sector includes the primary industries, manufacturing, construction and utilities.
The service sector includes the rest of the economy. Panel B in Figure 1 plots the proportion
of hours in services overall and by gender, and shows an increase of nearly 20 percentage
points in the share of market hours worked by both males and females in services. For
women, the service share was always substantially higher than for men, and rose from 74%
to 91%, while for men it rose from 50% to 68%. Panel C further shows that all of the (net)
increase in female hours took place in the service sector, while Panel D shows that all of
the (net) fall in male hours took place in the goods sector. In summary, while women were
moving - in net terms - from nonemployment into the service sector, men were moving from
the goods sector to nonemployment. These trends are also conrmed within broad skill
groups, as shown in Figure A1 in Appendix A.
Table 1 provides detailed evidence on hours shares and female intensities for goods and
services, and for seventeen ner industries. The 20 percentage pointsexpansion in the service
6Throughout the paper, hours and wage ratios indicate female values divided by male values.
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share is bound to raise female employment as the female intensity in services is on average
more than double the female intensity in the goods sector. A similar point can be made across
more disaggregated industries. The decline in the broad goods sector is disproportionately
driven by the fall in manufacturing industries and, to a lesser extent, primary industries.
Within the broad service sector, several industries contribute to its expansion (retail, FIRE,
business services, personal services, entertainment, health, education, professional services
and public administration). The female intensity is generally higher in the expanding service
industries than in the declining goods industries. A further stylized fact to note is that the
female intensity has risen in every industry.7 The evidence summarized in Table 1 thus
highlights both between- and within-industry components in the rise of female hours.
We quantify between- and within-industry components of trends in female hours by de-
composing the growth in the female hours share between 1968 and 2009 into a term reecting
the change in the share of services, and a term reecting changes in gender intensities within
either sector. Using a standard shift-share decomposition, the change in the female hours
share between year 0 and year t can be expressed as
lft =
X
j
fjljt +
X
j
jlfjt; (1)
where lft denotes the share of female hours in the economy in year t, ljt denotes the
overall share of hours in sector j, lfjt denotes the share of female hours in sector j, and
fj = (lfjt + lfj0) =2 and j = (ljt + lj0) =2 are decomposition weights. The rst term in
equation (1) represents the change in the female hours share that is attributable to struc-
tural transformation, while the second term reects changes in the female intensity within
sectors. The results of this decomposition are reported in Table 2. The rst row reports the
total change in the female hours share, which rises from 29.9% in 1968 to 45.3% in 2009. The
second row shows that just above one third of this change was explained by the growth in the
share of services, as measured by the rst term in equation (1). The third row performs the
same decomposition on 17, as opposed to two, industries, and delivers an identical estimate
of the role of the between-sector component. This means that, by focusing on our binary
decomposition, we do not miss important inter-industry dynamics in the rise in female hours.
We have motivated our focus on the sectoral dimension of gender developments based
on gender comparative advantages, via the more intensive use of non-physical tasks in the
production of services rather than goods. However, tasks are more directly associated to
occupations than sectors, and some sectors tend to use female labor more intensively because
they use more intensively occupations in which women have a comparative advantage. One
would thus expect to detect an important between-occupation component in the rise in
female hours. This is shown in the fourth row of Table 2, based on a 4-fold occupational
7The fall in the female intensity in the post and telecoms industry is an exception, entirely driven by the
near disappearance of telephone operators, who were 98% female at the start of our sample period.
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decomposition.8 The between-occupation component explains about 26% of the total. This
is somewhat smaller than the between-sector component, but still sizeable.
Between-sector and between-occupation dimensions are clearly not orthogonal. As the
distribution of occupations varies systematically across industries, a portion of the between-
occupation component may be explained by the expansion of industries in which female-
friendly occupations are over-represented. Between-occupation changes that are not captured
by changes in the industry structure would by denition be included in the within-industry
component of (1). We therefore decompose the within-industry component of (1) into within-
and between-occupation components. The full decomposition is
lft =
X
j
fjljt +
X
j
j
 X
k
fjkljkt +
X
k
jklfjkt
!
; (2)
where k indexes occupations, ljkt is the share of occupation k in industry j, lfjkt is the
share of female hours in occupation k and industry j, and fjk = (lfjkt + lfjk0) =2 and
jk = (ljkt + ljk0) =2: The rst term in (1) represents the between-industry component, the
second term represents the between-occupation component that takes place within industries,
and the last term represents the component that takes place within industryoccupation
cells. The results of this further decomposition are reported in the fth row of Table 2, and
show that only a small share (about 6%) of the growth in the female hours share took place
via the expansion of female-friendly occupations within sectors. The bulk of the growth in
female-friendly occupations took instead place via the expansion of the service share. We
thus focus the rest of the paper on a binary goods/services distinction, as the decomposition
results reported in Table 2 suggest that this is a su¢ cient dimension for understanding
relative female outcomes.
2.2 Wages
We turn next to evidence on wages in Figure 2. Panel A shows the evolution of the wage
ratio in the aggregate economy, obtained as the exponential of the gender gap in mean log
wages, unadjusted for characteristics. Womens hourly wages remained relatively stable at
or below 65% of male wages until about 1980, and then started rising up to about 80% at
the end of the sample period. The combined increase in female hours and wages raised the
female wage bill from 30% to two thirds of the male wage bill. When using hourly wages
adjusted for human capital (age and age squared, race and four education levels), the rise
in the gender wage ratio is slightly attenuated, from 64% in 1968 to 77% in 2009 (Panel B).
While a measure of actual, rather than potential, labor market experience is not available in
8This is the broad task-based grouping of occupations suggested by Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Cat-
egories are: professional, managerial and technical occupations; clerical and sales occupations; production
and operative occupations; service occupations.
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the CPS, estimates by Blau and Kahn (2013) on the PSID show that gender di¤erences in
actual experience explain about a third of the rise in the wage ratio between 1980 and 1999.
Thus there is clear evidence of closing - but still sizeable - gender gaps even after controlling
for actual labor market experience. Note nally that the trend in the wage ratio is very
similar across market sectors.
2.3 Home production
We nally provide evidence on the distribution of total work between market and home
production for each gender. Information on this is gathered from time use data, by linking
major time use surveys for the U.S: 1965-1966 Americas Use of Time; 1975-1976 Time
Use in Economics and Social Accounts; 1985 AmericansUse of Time; 1992-1994 National
Human Activity Pattern Survey; and 2003-2009 American Time Use Surveys. These surveys
are described in detail in Aguiar and Hurst (2007). As a measure of labor supply to the
market we use coremarket work (in the denition of Aguiar and Hurst, 2007), including
time worked on main jobs, second jobs and overtime, but excluding time spent commuting
to/from work and time spent on ancillary activities, including meal times and breaks. This
is the labor supply measure that is most closely comparable to market hours measured in the
CPS. However, no information on annual weeks worked is available from the time use surveys,
and all work indicators presented are weekly. To obtain a measure of home production we
sum hours spent on core household chores (cleaning, preparing meals, shopping, repairing
etc.) and hours of child care.
Figure 3 shows trends in market and home hours for men and women since 1965. The
series for market work of men and women clearly converge during the sample period: weekly
hours worked in the market rise from 19 to 23 for women, and fall from 42 to 33 for men.
The trends are very similar to those detected using the CPS in Figure 1A. The series for
home production also move closer to each other, as household hours fall from 38 to 28 for
women, and rise from 11 to 16 for men. Interestingly, there are no major gender di¤erences
in total hours of work (consistent with the iso-work nding of Burda, Hamermesh and Weil,
2013), but of course the market/home divide of total work di¤ers sharply across genders. For
women the share of market work in total work rises from one third in 1965 to 45% in 2009,
while for men this falls from 80% to two thirds. These trends are also conrmed within two
broad skill groups, as shown in Figure A2 in the Appendix, implying that marketization of
home production takes place across the skill distribution.
2.4 Summary
The evidence presented above has highlighted a number of stylized facts. First, over the past
few decades, market hours have substantially increased for women, but they have declined
9
for men, implying a near dobling of the hours ratio. Second, the share of market hours
in services has grown, and about one third of the rise in relative female hours took place
via the expansion of services. Third, female relative wages have increased. Fourth, home
production hours have risen for men and fallen from women. The model of the next section
rationalizes this set of facts by introducing structural transformation and marketization of
home production. Structural transformation leads to a rise in the wage ratio and a fall in
market hours for both genders. Marketization leads to a rise in market hours for both gender.
Due to gender comparative advantages, structural transformation has a stronger impact on
male market hours, while marketization has a stronger impact on female home hours. Thus
the combination of the two forces has a potential to explain the rise in the gender ratio of
market hours, and the fall in the gender ratio of home hours. By contruction, the model can
only explain the between-industry component of gender changes, which we have quantied
to one third, while it cannot address the within-sector rise in the female intensity. Our
approach thus complements previous work on within-sector forces explaining the remaining
two thirds of the increase in womens hours, which has focused on a variety of supply-side
explanations (see reference list in footnote 1), gender-biased technical change (Heathcote et
al., 2010), or antidiscrimination interventions (Goldin, 2006).
3 The Model
Motivated by the facts presented above, this Section presents a model for a multi-sector
economy to describe the joint dynamics of male and female market and home hours, as
well as the gender wage ratio. It should be emphasized that the proposed framework solely
relies on between-sector forces to deliver gender-specic trends. Also, our model does not
include leisure decisions, as time use data reveal that total working time was remarkably
similar across genders throughout our sample period.9 Finally, as the evolution of gender
time allocation across sectors is qualitatively similar across skills, the model focuses on the
time-allocation decisions of representative male and female agents.
The multi-sector economy is modeled in three steps. First, we describe a two-sector
market economy, producing goods and services, and show that structural transformation
raises the gender wage ratio as long as women have a comparative advantage in services.
Second, we introduce a home sector producing services that are close substitutes to market
services, and show that marketization of home production and structural transformation
jointly imply a rise in the wage ratio and in the share of market hours of women, relative
to men. To keep these steps simple, we derive results from the planners optimal resource
9The ratio between female and male total hours is 1.08 in 1965 and it very slightly declines to 1.03 in 2009.
On the other hand, the market share of total working time evolves very di¤erently across genders, rising
from 0.34 to 0.45 for women and falling from 0.79 to 0.67 for men. The allocation of total work between the
market and the home seems therefore the key margin to understand gender trends in market hours.
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allocation across sectors. Finally, the decentralized equilibrium is characterized in order to
highlight further predictions and quantitatively assess the role of structural transformation
and marketization in labor market trends.
3.1 Structural transformation and the wage ratio
Consider an economy with two sectors, producing goods and services respectively, according
to the following technology:
cj = AjLj; Lj =

jL
 1

fj +
 
1  j

L
 1

mj
 
 1
; j = 1; 2; (3)
where j = 1 denotes goods, and j = 2 denotes services, Aj denotes labor productivity, grow-
ing at _Aj=Aj  j, and Lj denotes labor inputs. The labor input used in each sector is a
CES aggregator of male (Lmj) and female hours (Lfj), where  is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between them, and 1 < 2 is imposed to capture womens comparative advantage in
producing services.
For each gender, the following resource constraint holds:
Lg1 + Lg2 = Lg g = f;m: (4)
Labor is fully mobile across sectors, equalizing marginal rates of technical substitution:
j
1  j

Lmj
Lfj
1=
= x; j = 1; 2; (5)
where x  wf=wm denotes the gender wage ratio. Combining conditions (4) and (5) for
j = 1; 2 gives the allocation of female hours:
Lf1
Lf
= T (x) 
x  Lm
Lf
  a2
a1   a2
; (6)
where aj  (1 j)=j; j = 1; 2. Given womens comparative advantage in services (implying
a1 > a2); the equilibrium condition (6) is downward sloping, i.e. T 0(x) < 0. The intuition
is that a higher wage ratio induces substitution away from female labor in all sectors, but
substitution is weaker in the sector in which women have a comparative advantage, as implied
by (5). Thus a higher wage ratio is associated with a lower share of female hours in the
goods sector. As Lm1=Lm2 is proportional to Lf1=Lf2 due to (5), lower Lf1=Lf implies
lower Lm1=Lm and an overall lower share of hours in the goods sector. Finally, note that
the equilibrium wage ratio lies within the range (x1; x2), where xj  1aj (Lm=Lf )
1= is the
equilibrium wage ratio for a one-sector economy with sector j only.
The result T 0(x) < 0 implies the following Proposition:
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Proposition 1 When women have a comparative advantage in producing services, shocks
that raise the service share lead to a higher wage ratio.
Proposition 1 is solely based on the assumption of gender comparative advantages, and
in particular it holds independently of product demand, and the specic process driving
structural transformation.
The result in Proposition 1 highlights the importance of considering a two-sector economy.
Specically, gender comparative advantages turn a seemingly gender-neutral shock such as
the rise in services into a de facto gender-biased shock. To see this more explicitly, consider
a one-sector model with a CES production function as in (3), characterized by a technology
parameter . The equilibrium wage ratio in this economy is given by
x =

1  

Lm
Lf
1=
; (7)
and it can only rise following an increase in the relative demand for female labor () or
a fall in its relative supply (Lf=Lm). The rise in aggregate  is typically interpreted as a
gender-biased demand shift.10 Note that the equilibrium wage ratio in the one-sector model
falls within the (x1; x2) range dened above if  falls within the (1; 2) range. Specically, if
the two models imply the same hours allocation, (6) and (7) imply equal equilibrium wage
ratios if the following condition is satised:

1   =

Lf1
Lf

1  1
1

+
Lf2
Lf

1  2
2
 1=
: (8)
In other words, the  parameter in the one-sector can be interpreted as a function of 1 and
2 in the two-sector model, with weights given by the sectoral hours share. The advantage of
explicitly deriving equilibrium in a two-sector model is that the implied aggregate  evolves
endogenously with the industry structure. That is, structural transformation acts as a form
of gender-biased demand shift that raises the aggregate ; resulting in a higher wage ratio.
3.2 Structural Transformation and Marketization
We next introduce a home sector to account for changes in the allocation of total work
between the market and the home. As the home sector a¤ects equilibrium by producing
services that are close substitutes to market services, we now fully characterize utility over
each sectors output.
Individuals consume goods and a combination of market and home services. The assumed
utility function is a nested-CES specication:
U (c1; cs; ch) 
h
!c
" 1
"
1 + (1  !) c
" 1
"
2
i "
" 1
; c2 =
h
 c
 1

s + (1   ) c
 1

h
i 
 1
; (9)
10Heathcote et al. (2010) show in a one-sector model that this kind of gender-biased demand shift can
explain the bulk of the rise in relative female hours.
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where c1 denotes goods, cs denotes market services, ch denotes home services, and c2 denotes
all services combined. Goods and services are poor substitutes (" < 1), while market and
home services are good substitutes ( > 1) in the combined service bundle.
Market and home services are produced with identical technologies, except for the level
of labor productivity:
cj = Aj

2L
 1

fj + (1  2)L
 1

mj
 
 1
j = s; h; (10)
where productivity growth in the market is assumed to be at least as fast as in the home:
s > h. In addition to (4), there is a labor allocation constraint within services:
Lgs + Lgh = Lg2 g = f;m: (11)
Note that Lg still denotes total working hours for each gender and is exogenous, while labor
supply to the market is now given by (Lg1 + Lgs) and is endogenous.
The equilibrium allocation is characterized in two steps. We rst solve for the optimal
allocation of service hours between the market and the home, and next solve for the optimal
allocation of total hours between the goods and service sectors.
3.2.1 Labor allocation across market and home services
The optimal allocation of labor between market and home services can be obtained by max-
imizing c2 in (9) with respect to (Lfs; Lms; Lfh; Lmh), subject to the resource constraints in
(11). Free labor mobility between the market and the home implies equalization of marginal
rates of technical substitution. As the respective production functions are identical, this
implies:
Lfs
Lms
=
Lfh
Lmh
=
Lf2
Lm2
; (12)
where resource constraints (11) are used to derive the second equality.
Free mobility also implies equalization of the marginal revenue product of labor, thus:
Lfs
Lfh
= Rmh 

 
1   
 
As
Ah
 1
: (13)
Condition (13) describes the process of marketization: as market and home services are good
substitutes ( > 1), faster productivity growth in market services shifts female hours from
the home to the market. A corresponding condition can be derived for male hours.
Finally, we derive a hypothetical production function for the composite service output
c2, which is equivalent to (3) for the two-sector model, with the qualication that the pro-
ductivity index A2 depends on As and Ah according to (full derivation in Appendix 6.1.2):
A2 =  

 1As

Rmh
1 +Rmh
  1
 1
: (14)
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Its growth is a weighted average of productivity growth in market and home services, with
weights given by the share of labor in each sector:
2 =
Rmh
1 +Rmh
s +
1
1 +Rmh
h:
Thus productivity growth in the composite service output is endogenously determined by
the process of marketization. Following the aggregation of market and home services into c2;
the equilibrium wage ratio and hours allocation still satises (6), with A2 dened by (14).
The model is closed by equalizing the marginal revenue product of labor across sectors.
3.2.2 Labor allocation across goods and services
To describe the optimal labor allocation between the goods and service sectors, we equalize
the marginal revenue product of labor using the production function (3) and the utility
function (9). This allows us to express the female hours allocation Lf1=Lf2 as a function of
the wage ratio x :
Lf1
Lf2
 R (x) =

!
1  !
"
A2
A1
1 "
1
2
"
z2 (x)
z1 (x)
1 "=
; (15)
where
zj (x)  Lj
Lfj
= 

 1
j
 
1 + ajx
 1  1 ; j = 1; 2: (16)
We then impose the resource constraint for female hours (4) into (15) to obtain
Lf1
Lf
= D (x)  R (x)
1 +R (x)
: (17)
Conditions (6) and (17) state the optimal input and output allocations, respectively, and
can be solved for equilibrium Lf1=Lf and x: Given a1 > a2; we show in the Appendix
6.1.1 that the slope of (15) has the sign of    ". Intuitively, the slope of (17) depends
on input substitutability () relative to output substitutability ("): input substitutability
diverts female labor from goods to services following a rise in the wage ratio, while output
substitutability diverts consumption from services to goods, as services use female labor more
intensively. Output substitutability thus reduces the demand for female labor in services.
Input substitutability dominates, and a rise in the wage ratio is associated with a fall in
Lf1=Lf , whenever  > ": This is the most realistic case, as typically  > 1. Thus D (x)
is downward-sloping but it is atter than T (x) due to the presence of o¤setting input and
output substitutability. As D0 (x) > T 0 (x) ; equilibrium is unique, as represented by the
intersection of (6) and (17) in the (x; Lf1=Lf ) space in Figure 4.
We next consider shocks to the allocation condition (17). Given (15), D(x) shifts down-
wards whenever 1 > 2, i.e. if and only if productivity grows faster in the goods than the
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(composite) service sector. The shift in D(x) traces equilibrium downward along the T (x)
curve (6), resulting in higher x and lower Lf1=Lf : Thus the following Proposition can be
established:
Proposition 2 Market services and the wage ratio rise together if and only if 1 > 2.
This result has two components. The rst component, related to the shift in D (x),
is common to the structural transformation literature: faster labor productivity growth
in the goods sector shifts resources from the goods to service sectors, due to poor output
substitutability. The second component is novel: since women have a comparative advantage
in the services sector, uneven labor productivity growth across sectors acts as an increase in
relative demand for female labor, which in turn raises the equilibrium wage ratio.
As stated in Proposition 2, uneven labor productivity growth (1 > 2) is a necessary
condition to simultaneously predict a rise in market services and the wage ratio. Clearly, if
productivity growth is balanced across all sectors, 1 = s = h; the service share and the
wage ratio are both una¤ected. However, the Proposition still holds in two special cases,
1 > s = h and 1 = s > h : In the rst case, faster productivity growth in the goods
than service sector, combined with poor output substitutability, shifts labor from goods
to services, leading to a higher service share and wage ratio. In the second case, faster
productivity growth in market services than home services, combined with good output
substitutability, pulls (mostly female) labor out of the household, with a corresponding
increase in the market service share and the wage ratio. This mechanism acts like a labor
demand shock that raises the wage ratio and female market hours, and reduces female home
hours. Clearly, whenever 1 > s > h; both mechanisms are at work. For the ease of the
discussion (though not necessary), we proceed by assuming 1 > s > h and dene:
MF  (s   h) (   1) > 0; SF  (1  ") (1   s) > 0; (18)
where MF denotes the driving force of marketization as discussed in (13), and SF denotes
the driving force of structural transformation as discussed in (15). Both are combinations of
exogenous parameters, and their e¤ects on wages and hours work via the shifts in Rmh and
R (x). More precisely, let 4Rmh=Rmh and 4R (x) =R (x) denote shifts in Rmh and R (x) ;
respectively, due to uneven productivity growth. Using (13) one obtains:
4Rmh
Rmh
= MF; (19)
and using (15) and (14) one obtains:
 4R (x)
R(x)
= (1  ") (1   2) = SF +
1  "
   1
MF
1 +Rmh
: (20)
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The shift in 4R (x) rises with both structural transformation and marketization, and the
latter e¤ect is amplied by lower ", , and Rmh. Note in particular that ongoing marketi-
zation (MF > 0) has a progressively weaker impact on R (x) due to the automatic rise in
Rmh at the denominator.
By combining the above results (13) and (15), we nally obtain the equilibrium service
share:
s =
"
1 +

As
A1
1 "
1 +Rmh
Rmh
 "
 1
G (x)
# 1
; (21)
where
G (x) =

!
1  !
"
1
2
 (1 ")
 1

1 + a2x
 1
1 + a1x
 1
  "
 1 1 + a1x

1 + a2x

: (22)
Conditional on x; the service share (21) rises with both structural transformation and mar-
ketization. There are two further, opposing e¤ects via equilibrium x, represented by the last
two terms in equation (22), which turn out to be minimal compared to the direct e¤ects
from SF and MF:11
3.2.3 Gender outcomes
We next turn to the models prediction for market hours worked by each gender. Let g 
1  Lgh=Lg denote the share of market hours in total working hours for each gender. Using
(15) and (13), for women this ratio is given by
f  1 
Lfh
Lf
= 1  1
1 +R (x)
1
1 +Rmh
: (23)
Combining the hours ratios in (5) and (12) yields
1  m
1  f
=
Lf
Lm
(a2x)
 =
R (x) + 1
a1
a2

R (x) + 1
; (24)
where the second equality follows from the equilibrium conditions (6) and (17). The rst
equality describes the substitution e¤ect between male and female hours in home production,
whereby a higher wage ratio discourages relative female hours in home production. The
second equality links this e¤ect to the role of structural transformation and marketization.
Specically, if women have a comparative advantage in producing services (a1 > a2), the
rise in female market hours, as reected in (24), results from structural transformation and
marketization according to (20).
11Given a1 > a2; the rising wage ratio raises the relative cost of female hours, which has a negative impact
on service share. This works through the term 1+a

1x

1+a2x
 in (22). On the other hand, rising x induces more
women to move from the goods to the service sector, raising s through the term

1+a2x
 1
1+a1x
 1
  "
 1
in (22):
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The share of market hours for men can be derived using (23) and (24):
m = 1 
1
a1
a2

R (x) + 1
1
1 +Rmh
: (25)
It follows from (23) and (25) that falling R (x) shifts hours of work from the market to the
household for both genders, whereas rising Rmh shifts hours of work from the household to
the market. The e¤ects of structural transformation and marketization are summarized as
follows:
Proposition 3 For both genders, the share of market hours g falls with structural trans-
formation but rises with marketization.
While structural transformation and marketization are dened as gender-neutral by (18),
due to womens comparative advantage in services they have gender-biased e¤ects, as implied
by (23) and (25). In particular, the rise in Rmh has a stronger e¤ect on f than m, while
the fall in R (x) has a stronger e¤ect on m than f : Thus both structural transformation
and marketization imply a rise in the gender ratio of the share of market hours:
Proposition 4 Given womens comparative advantage in services, both structural transfor-
mation and marketization lead to a rise in womens market hours share relative to men,
f=m.
As evidence shows that the change in total working time is similar across genders, Propo-
sition 4 also implies a rise in womens market hours relative to men.
3.3 A decentralized economy
The planner solution illustrates the e¤ect of uneven productivity growth on the service
share, the wage ratio and the gender ratio in market hours. We next derive the decentralized
equilibrium of this economy to gain further insight on how the underlying driving forces
work via householdschoices. In particular, the decentralized equilibrium shows that uneven
productivity growth generates a rise in the service share through both relative price and
income e¤ects in householdsconsumption decisions. The rise in wage ratio, driven by the
rise in services, in turn a¤ects the gender hours allocation through householdslabor supply
decisions.
In doing this, the model of the previous subsection is slightly generalized to allow womens
comparative advantage in services to di¤er between the household and the market. Thus the
services production function (10) is replaced by
cj = Aj

jL
 1

fj +
 
1  j

L
 1

mj
 
 1
; j = s; h: (26)
This generalization allows more exibility in the derivation of quantitative results.
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3.3.1 Firms and Households
Both market sectors are perfectly competitive. Taking wages (wf ; wm) and prices (p1; ps) as
given, rms in sector j = 1; s choose (Lmj; Lfj) to maximize prots, subject to technologies
in (3). Prot maximization implies:
wf = pjAjj

Lj
Lfj
1=
; wm = pjAj
 
1  j
 Lj
Lmj
1=
; j = 1; s: (27)
Under free labor mobility, the equalization of the marginal rate of technical substitution
(5) still holds. Combined with (16), this implies that relative prices are a function of the
wage ratio:
pk
pj
=
Ajj
Akk

zj (x)
zk (x)
1=
; j; k = 1; s: (28)
Each household consists of a male and a female, with a joint utility function (9). Given
wages (wf ; wm) and prices (p1; ps), a representative household chooses a consumption vector
(c1; cs; ch) and home production vector (Lmh; Lfh) ; and supply the remaining working time
to the market. Specically, the household maximizes the utility function (9) subject (26)
and the household budget constraint:
p1c1 + p2c2 = wm (Lm   Lmh) + wf (Lf   Lfh) : (29)
Utility maximization implies that (5) holds for the home sector, j = h; and that the
marginal rate of substitution across any two commodities must equal their relative price.
Perfect labor mobility between the household and the market implies that (27) holds for j =
h; thus an implicit price for home services can be dened as ph  wgAh(@Lh=@Lgh) ; g = f;m;
and condition (28) also holds for j = h.
Using the utility function (9), the relative demand for market services is
cs
ch
=

ph
ps
 
 
1   

;
and the corresponding relative expenditure is given by
Esh  pscs
phch
=

ph
ps
 1
 
1   

: (30)
As market and home services are good substitutes ( > 1) ; a fall in the price of market
services shifts households expenditure from home to market services. Thus the process
of marketization can be viewed as an outcome of both households consumption and labor
supply decisions.
Using utility functions (9), the relative demand of goods to market services is
c1
cs
=

!
1  !
ps
p1
"
 
 "
 1
"
1 +
1   
 

ch
cs
 1

# "
 1
:
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and the relative expenditure is:
E1s =

p1
ps
1 "
!
1  !
"
 
 "
 1
"
1 +

1   
 
 
ps
ph
 1# " 1
: (31)
As relative prices are a function of the wage ratio, the relative expenditure is also a function
of the wage ratio. As derived in (28) for j = 1; s; h, uneven labor productivity growth implies
a rising relative price of market services to goods, ps=p1; and a rising cost of home production
relative to market services, ph=ps: Both imply a fall in the relative expenditure E1s according
to (31).
Two mechanisms induce the decline in E1s: The rst is a relative price e¤ect: as goods
and services are poor substitutes (" < 1) ; a rise in the relative price of services reduces
expenditure on goods relative to market services. The second is an income e¤ect, via mar-
ketization: higher wage income raises the opportunity cost of home production ph; which
leads to substitute home production for market services, as these are closer substitute for
home production than goods ( > "). This income e¤ect is driven by the nested CES utility
function (9), in which the presence of home services implies non-homothetic utility in goods
and market services. Marketization thus provides a channel whereby the income elasticity
of demand is higher for market services than for goods.12
Finally, using the budget constraint (29), the supply of female home production hours
can be derived as a function of the relative expenditures:
Lfh
Lf
=
Ih (x)
I (x)
X
j=1;s;h
Ejh
; (32)
where Ij(x) denotes the female wage bill share in sector j and I (x) denotes the female wage
bill share in total work:
Ij (x)  wfLfj
pjyj
= j [zj (x)]
1= 1 ; I (x)  wfLf
wfLf + wmLm
:
As relative expenditures are functions of the wage ratio as in (30) and (31), the fraction of
female hours supplied to the market f  1   Lfh=Lf is also a function of the wage ratio.
Intuitively, (32) states that when the expenditure for either market commodity rises relative
to home production, and/or when the female wage bill share in the market rises more than
in the household, women reallocate their working time from the household to the market.
12The link between the income elasticity of services and home production is rst noted by Kongsamut,
Rebelo and Xie (2001), who use a non-homothetic utility function dened over c1 and (cs + c), where c is an
exogenous constant. They state on p.7 that c can be viewed as representing home production of services,
but they do not provide an explicit model for its determination.
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3.3.2 Market Equilibrium
Given the optimal rm and household decisions, the wage ratio is derived from goods and la-
bor market clearing conditions. Goods market clearing implies that womens time allocation
can be expressed as functions of relative expenditures
Lfi
Lfj
= Eij
i
j

zi (x)
zj (x)
1= 1
= Eij
Ii (x)
Ij (x)
; i; j = 1; s; h; (33)
which states that the sectoral allocation of hours is determined by the between-sector allo-
cation of expenditure and the within-sector gender wage bill shares. By substituting (33)
into the female time constraint (11), the demand for female home production time is given
by
Lfh
Lf
=
1X
j=1;s;h
Ejh
Ij(x)
Ih(x)
; (34)
and is a function of the wage ratio. Together with the supply condition in (32), labor market
clearing implies that the equilibrium wage ratio x satises:
I (x)
X
j=1;s;h
Ejh  
X
j=1;s;h
Ij (x)Ejh = 0: (35)
Thus the gender wage ratio x, and, as a result, female labor supply f ; depend on relative
expenditures, in turn reecting gender neutral shocks: It is important to point out that
Propositions 1-4 hold in this more general model for s close to h.
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4 Quantitative Results
Below we quantitatively assess the importance of structural transformation and marketiza-
tion in accounting for the rise in the wage ratio and changes in time allocation. The models
outcomes are related to the data in the following way. The hours allocation across market
sectors is obtained from the CPS, and is represented by series plotted in Panel B of Figure
1. We aim to account for the rise in the service share for the aggregate economy, s, as well
as for each gender separately (sf and sm). The wage ratio x is obtained from the CPS, and
is adjusted for characteristics, as in Panel B of Figure 2. The hours allocation between the
market and the home is obtained from time use data, and from series plotted in Figure 3
we calculate f and m. Changes in these variables are shown in Table 3. To smooth out
short-run uctuations that are not relevant for model predictions, and possibly single-year
outliers, we focus on 5-year averages at the beginning and at the end of the sample period.
13The main change is the presence of additional equilibrium e¤ect via the wage ratio x, as equation 12
does not hold for s 6= h.
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While in most calibration exercises one would match data targets at the start of the
sample period and make predictions forward by feeding in an exogenous driving force, we
match data targets at the end of the sample period and make predictions backward. The
reason for this choice is that our model abstracts from an important factor identied in the
literature for the rise in the wage ratio, and namely the decline in labor market discrimination
against women (see, among others, Goldin, 2006). It would be thus unreasonable to force
our model to match gender moments for the late 1960s, as the implied parameters would
be far from the true ones even if our model were a good description of the economy except
for gender discrimination. It seems instead more reasonable for a model without gender
discrimination to match gender-specic moments in the late 2000s. Thus we match the wage
ratio and time allocation for 2005-2009, and then feed in the measured SF and MF to
predict the average wage ratio and time allocation in 1968-1972.
4.1 Baseline parameters
The driving forces of structural transformation and marketization are dened as SF 
(1  ") (1   s) and MF  (   1) (s   h), respectively. Existing work suggests an elas-
ticity of substitution between market goods and services on one side and home production on
the other side in the range of 1.5 to 2.3 (see Rupert et al., 1995, and Chang and Schorfheide,
2003). As  denotes the elasticity of substitution between market services and home pro-
duction, it should be as least as large as the elasticity of substitution between any market
good and home production. Thus we use the upper bound of existing estimates  = 2:3 as
a benchmark. Ngai and Pissarides (2008) review previous work on the elasticity of substi-
tution between goods and services and suggest (0; 0:3) as a plausible range for ". Relatively
low values for " are also consistent with the recent ndings in Herrendorf et al. (2013a) on
newly-constructed consumption value-added data. Herrendorf et al. (2013a) argue that, if
the sectoral production functions are value-added production functions, as in our model, the
arguments of the utility function should be the value added components of nal consump-
tion - as opposed to nal consumption expenditures. Using input-output tables to construct
time-series for consumption value-added, they obtain an estimate for " of 0.002, which we
use as our benchmark value. This estimate is not signicantly di¤erent from zero and our
results are unchanged by setting " = 0.
Labor productivity growth in market sectors is obtained from Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis (BEA) data, delivering real labor productivity growth in the goods and services sectors
of 2.47% and 1.24% respectively, and we approximate their di¤erence to 1   s = 1:2%:14
14Strictly speaking j does not coincide with labor productivity growth, as Aj denotes the productivity of
the composite labor input Lj dened in equation (3). But one can map labor productivity into Aj using data
on gender intensities and j ; which can be obtained from (5). Using this approach we obtain a productivity
growth di¤erence between goods and services of 1.12%. The drawback of this approach is to factor in changes
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To obtain a measure of labor productivity growth in the home sector, we follow recent BEA
calculations of U.S. household production using national accounting conventions (see Bridg-
man et al., 2012, and references therein). The BEA approach consists in estimating home
nominal value added by imputing income to labor and capital used in home production,
and deating this using the price index for the private household sector. During our sam-
ple period, this procedure yields an estimate of average labor productivity growth in home
production of 0.5% (Bridgman, 2013).15 Thus we set s  h = 0:7% as our benchmark. We
perform sensitivity analysis with respect to (; "; s   h) in Section 5.4.
Given SF and MF , the models predictions for the dynamics of hours allocation and
the wage ratio depend on the elasticity of substitution  and the comparative advantages
1; s and h. To choose a value for , we draw on existing estimates by Weinberg (2000),
who obtains an estimate for  for the US of 2:4, and Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004), who
obtain estimates ranging between 2.5 and 4. In what follows we set the baseline value of 
at 3, which roughly coincides with the average of existing estimates, and we allow for higher
 in the sensitivity analysis of Section 5.4.
Finally, setting 2005-2009 as the baseline period, denoted by t, six parameters are cho-
sen to match the predicted values for
 
xt ; st ; sft ; smt ; ft ; mt

in the data at baseline:
the gender-specic technology parameters 1; s and h, the gender ratio of total hours,
Lft=Lmt, and (a transformation of) relative productivity A^1st and A^sht, dened as:16
A^sht  Ast
Aht

1   
 
 
1 
; A^1st  A1t
Ast

1  !
!
 "
1 "
 
 "
1  "
1 " : (36)
The value of Lft=Lmt needs to be consistent with both the hours allocation between
the home and the market (obtained from time use surveys) and the share of services in the
market economy (obtained from the CPS), and thus it is pinned down by ft, mt, st,
sft, and smt. The implied Lft=Lmt for the 2005-2009 is 1.19, which is close to the number
obtained by directly adding market and home hours from the CPS and time use surveys,
in j , in turn driving changes in gender intensities within sectors, from which our baseline calibration would
abstract. As this approach and labor productivity data yield very similar values for di¤erences in productivity
growth, we simply use labor productivity data.
15Bridgeman (2013) obtains productivity in the home sector as:
Ah =
whLh +
P
j (rj + j)Kjh
PhLh
;
where wh denotes the wage of private household employees; Lh denotes hours worked in the household sector;
Kjh denotes the capital inputs used (consumer durables, residential capital, government infrastructure used
for home production), with assiciated returns and depreciation rates rj and j , respectively; and Ph is the
price index for the sector private households with employed persons. This includes both the wage of private
sector employees and imputed rental services provided by owner-occupied housing. The average growth in
Ah during our sample period is 0.51%, which we approximate to 0.5%.
16Note that the growth rate for A^jk;t is equal to
 
j   k

for j; k = 1; 2; h. Thus data on (1; s; h) are
su¢ cient to predict trends in A^jk:
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respectively (1.12). These two gures would di¤er whenever actual hours are also a¤ected by
important factors not present in the model, such as discrimination against women or barriers
to mobility across sectors. Thus obtaining similar gures suggests that a simple model
without discrimination or mobility barriers does a relatively good job at capturing the gender
ratio in total hours for 2005-2009. Given Lft=Lmt and xt, condition (5) can be solved for
j, j = 1; s; h, and conditions (28), (30) and (31) can be solved for A^1st and A^sht. Appendix
6.2.1 shows detailed steps by which the six data targets
 
xt ; st ; sft ; smt ; ft ; mt

can be
matched by the six parameters

Lft=Lmt ; 1; s; h; A^1st ; A^sht

:
Given these six parameters and the measured SF andMF , the model delivers predictions
for
 
xt; st; sft; smt; ft; mt

at each point in time t. Baseline parameters are summarized as
follows:
Parameters Values Data or Targets
1   s 1.2% BEA data.
s   h 0.7% BEA data for services and Bridgeman (2013) for home sector.
 2.3 Chang and Schorfheide (2003).
" 0.002 Herrendorf et. al. (2013b).
 3 Weinberg (2000), Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004).
Lft=Lmt 1.19 match st given (sft ; smt ; ft ; mt)
1 0.332 match xt and
Lf1t
Lm1t
=
1 sft
1 smt
ft
mt
Lft
Lmt
s 0.443 match xt and
Lfst
Lmst
=
sft
smt
ft
mt
Lft
Lmt
h 0.495 match xt and
Lfht
Lmht
=
1 ft
1 mt
Lft
Lmt
A^sht 1.02 match
Lfst
Lfht
=
ftsft
1 ft
A^1st 10.8 match
Lf1t
Lfst
=
1 sft
sft
4.2 Baseline Results
Table 4 reports our quantitative results. The top two rows in the Table show data targets,
and Panels A-C report results based on alternative parameter combinations. Simulations in
Panel A are based on the baseline parameter values described above. Column 1 shows that
our model almost exactly replicates the rise in the overall service share from 58% to 75%
of market hours. Columns 2 and 3 show predictions on the service share for each gender
separately: the model explains the bulk of the rise in service hours for women (83%) but
overpredicts service hours for men (141%).
The next three columns concern time allocation between the market and the home. The
average woman allocates 36% of her working hours to the market in the late 1960s, and
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45% in the late 2000s, while the corresponding ratio for men falls from 78% to 68%. The
model explains 47% of the rise in market hours for women (column 4), 7% of the fall for men
(column 5), and 36% of the rise in the gender ratio of market hours (column 6). To relate
sectoral gender outcomes to the shift-share analysis of Section 2, we obtain predictions for
the ratio in female share of total market hours, fLf=(fLf + mLm): The model predicts
an increase in this ratio from 0.429 to 0.444, which is equivalent to about 19% of its actual
change. The shift-share analysis of Section 2 has shown that 34% of the rise in the female
hours share was driven by the rise in services. The model thus predicts about 55% (19/34)
of the between-sector component of the rise in female hours.
Finally, the wage ratio rises from 0.64 to 0.77, and the model accounts for 20% of the
observed wage convergence (column 7). To put this gure into perspective, it may be noted
that our models contribution is quantitatively similar to the contribution of the rise in
womens human capital (as proxied by education, potential experience and ethnicity, see
notes to Figure 2), as including basic human capital controls explains about 23% of wage
convergence over the sample period.17
As both structural transformation and marketization drive our baseline results, in Panels
B and C we conduct counterfactual experiments to assess each force in turn. In Panel B
we shut the structural transformation channel, by setting 1 = s. The only active force
is marketization and, as one would expect, the model now explains a much lower portion
of the rise in services, both overall and for women and men separately (38%, 28% and
54%, respectively). This also mutes the predicted rise in the wage ratio (column 7), in line
with Proposition 1. Note further that a model without structural transformation improves
model predictions for female market hours (column 4), as structural transformation shifts
resources from the goods to the service sector, including the home. By contrast, structural
transformation is key to account for the fall in market hours for men (column 5), as a
model without structural transformation would actually predicts a rise, rather than a fall,
in male market hours. In the absence of structural transformation, men are only subject to
marketization, shifting their working hours from the home to the market.
In Panel C we shut the marketization channel, by setting s = h. As in Panel B,
the model predicts a smaller rise in services (columns 1-3). Column 4 next shows that
marketization is essential to attract female hours to the market, as without marketization
female market hours would fall as a consequence of structural transformation, while column
5 shows that removing marketization improves the predictions for male market hours, which
now fall more than in the baseline case. Finally, column 7 shows that marketization alone
has a small negative e¤ect on wage ratio. This is due to the fact that, according to our
17During the sample period the raw wage ratio rises by about 17 percentage points (80:5   63:2), while
the adjusted wage ratio rises by about 13 percentage points (77:5 64:1, as reported in Table 5). Thus basic
human capital controls explain about 23% of wage convergence.
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calibration, h > s, i.e. women have stronger comparative advantages in home than market
services. Thus marketization shifts female hours to the branch of services in which women
have a smaller comparative advantage.
The comparison of Panels B and C clearly conrms Propositions 3 and 4. Market hours
for both genders fall with structural transformation and rise with marketization. But, due to
gender comparative advantages, marketization has a stronger e¤ect on female market hours,
while structural transformation has a stronger e¤ect on male market hours, and they both
contribute to the rise in f=m. Quantitatively, MF contributes about 80% of the predicted
rise in f=m whereas SF contributes the remaining 20%. Also note that both structural
transformation and marketization are quantitatively important in accounting for the rise in
services, contributing about 55% and 39% of the predicted rise, respectively (whereby the
rest would be accounted for by their interaction).
4.3 Gender-specic shocks
We next compare baseline results to the outcomes of gender-specic, within-sector shocks.18
These are (1) labor supply shocks, represented by changes in the total hours ratio, Lf=Lm,
(2) gender-biased technological progress, represented by a rise in 1 and s; and (3) gender-
biased accumulation of human capital. The results are presented in Table 5, in which Panel
A reports baseline results for reference.
4.3.1 Gender shifts in total hours
Changes in Lft=Lmt can be driven by both changes in the gender mix in the population and
changes in the gender-specic time allocation between work (market and home) and other
activities (leisure, sleep and personal care). Our model is silent about either force, and we
pick the growth rate in Lft=Lmt that matches their combined e¤ect. During the sample
period, the population ratio falls from 1.143 to 1.088 in the CPS, while the hours ratio rises
from 1.046 (average of 1965 and 1975) to 1.025 in time use surveys. Together, these gures
imply a fall of 0.18% per year in the hours ratio.
Panel B in Table 5 shows the e¤ects of a fall in Lft=Lmt. The model can now account
for 34.4% of the rise in the wage ratio, due to the slight fall in female hours. This e¤ect
corresponds to an upward shift in the T (x) curve in Figure 4, resulting in higher x: Labor
supply shocks do not a¤ect in any discernible way other model predictions. In particular,
as labor supply shocks are sector-neutral, they have little e¤ect on the allocation of labor
across the three sectors.
18Note that the between-sector forces considered predict a fall in the female intensity within each sector,
following the rise in relative wages. However, female intensity has risen slightly in the goods sector, and
markedly in the service sector (see Table 1). Gender-specic shocks may thus revert model predictions for
within-sector female intensities.
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4.3.2 Gender-biased technical change
Structural transformation induces a gender-biased labor demand shift by raising relative
labor demand in the sector in which women have a comparative advantage. The aggregate
 thus rises endogenously via a change in the composition of employment at constant 1
and s; as explicitly shown in equation (8). The strength of this mechanism depends on
the di¤erence s   1. In our calibration exercise, in which 1 and s are pinned down by
within-sector gender intensities, s = 0:44 and 1 = 0:33, in turn predicting an increase in
the wage ratio equal to about one fth of its actual rise.
We next allow for an exogenous rise in both 1 and s as in Heathcote et al. (2010).
Specically, Heathcote et al. (2010) assume perfect substitutability of male and female
hours in production ( ! 1); implying x = = (1  ) : Growth in = (1  ) is in turn set
to match the observed rise in the wage ratio at 0.5% per year, and in their calibrated model
this accounts for three quarters of the increase in relative female hours.
Borrowing from Heathcote et al. (2010), we let 1= (1  1) and s= (1  s) grow at 0.5%
per year. The simulation results are reported in Panel C of Table 5. The model now predicts
more than the whole rise in female market hours, the whole increase in the gender ratio in
market hours, and 68% of the rise in the wage ratio.19 The comparison of Panels A and B
reveals that structural transformation and marketization capture an important portion of
gender-biased demand shifts, and namely 30% of the predicted increase in the wage ratio
(20/68) and 36% of the predicted increase in the gender ratio of market hours.
4.3.3 Human capital
While the previous exercise is agnostic as to the cause of the rise in within-sector female
intensities, we next consider a measurable shock leading to a similar outcome, and namely the
rise in womens relative human capital investment. This change may be easily incorporated
in our model by replacing raw labor inputs by e¢ ciency units of labor, hgjLgj, where hgj
denotes the e¢ ciency units of one hour of work for gender g in sector j: The composite labor
input in sector j is now given by:
Lj =
h
j (hfjLfj)
 1
 +
 
1  j

(hmjLmj)
 1

i 
 1
; j = 1; s; h;
where human capital e¢ ciency is assumed to be constant across market sectors for each
gender, hg1 = hgs = hg, but may be lower in the household. The market wage wg now
includes the return to human capital.
The introduction of human capital a¤ects equilibrium via changes in relative prices and
19The reason we cannot explain the whole rise in the wage ratio is that we assume  = 3 whereas Heathcote
et al. (2010) assume   !1:
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wages. To see this, prot maximization implies:
wf = pjAjhfjj

Lj
hfjLfj
1=
; wm = pjAjhmj
 
1  j
 Lj
hmjLmj
1=
; j = 1; s;
where
Lj
hfjLfj
= 

 1
j
 
1 + bjx
 1  1 j = 1; s; h
and the relevant measure of gender comparative advantages is now
bj =
1  j
j

hmj
hfj
  1

= aj

hmj
hfj
  1

j = 1; s; h: (37)
Whether or not human capital is productive in the household has key implications. If human
capital is equally useful in the market and at home, b1, bs and bh are all falling at the same
rate, according to (37), as women are accumulating human capital faster than men. If human
capital is not productive at home (hmh = hfh = 1), bh stays constant (with bh = ah); and b1
and bs are falling relative to bh: This mechanism gives both genders an additional incentive
to work in the market, and it is stronger for women than for men. The fall in b1 and bs has
qualitatively similar impacts to rising 1 and s in a model without human capital.
We proceed by simply matching the growth in hm and hf to the gender-specic evolution
of human capital observed in the data. To this purpose, we use the coe¢ cients on the
education dummies from wage equations (see notes to Figure 2) to construct the human
capital index hgt for each gender in each year as
hgt = exp(
HShHSgt + 
SChSCgt + 
CChCCgt );
where the h0s are shares of the gender-specic population in each schooling category, and
the 0s are the associated coe¢ cients from the wage regression (dropouts being the excluded
category). During 1968-2009, the implied human capital index grows at 0:49% per year for
females and at 0:38% for males. The steps for the calibration of this extended model are
described in Appendix ??.
Panels D1 and D2 of Table 5 report quantitative results. The wage ratio x is now
calibrated to the unadjusted wage ratio, which increases from 0.63 to 0.81. If human capital
is useful in all sectors (panle D1), the rise in relative female human capital simply drives,
unsurprisingly, a larger increase in the unadjusted wage ratio, but is roughly neutral with
respect to all other outcomes. The case in which human capital is only useful in the market
(Panel D2) delivers deeper insight. Two forces are at work here. First, the rise in hf=hm
implies a fall in b1 and bs at 0.1% relative to bh, with similar e¤ects to the gender-biased
shift in labor demand represented in Panel C, in which a1 and as are falling exogenously
at 0.5% per year. Second, the rise in womens relative human capital implies stronger
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marketization for women than for men, thereby reinforcing the models prediction for f
and f=m: Comparing Panels A and D2, these two forces double the models predictions on
f and f=m: On the other hand, the introduction of human capital worsens the models
prediction for the fall in male market hours, as marketization rises for men too - albeit less
than for women.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We next perform some sensitivity analysis on parameters "; ; s h and . The results are
reported in Table 6. In Panel B we allow for a higher elasticity of substitution between male
and female labor,  = 10: All baseline predictions remained virtually unchanged, except
the model now can only account for 6% of the rise in the wage ratio, as higher gender
substitutability reduces the implied female comparative advantage in services, according to
(5). In particular the resulting (1; s; h) values are (0.40, 0.44, 0.45), and 1 and s are too
close to each other for structural transformation to have a sizeable impact on the wage ratio.
In the rest of the Table we let the strength of marketization and structural transformation
vary, according to alternative levels of ";  and s   h: Given that our utility structure is
similar to that of Ngai and Pissarides (2008), in Panel B we use their benchmark value
of " = 0:1, which implies a reduction in the intensity of structural transformation. Model
predictions improve slightly for the male service share sm and female market hours f , but
slightly worsen in most other dimensions, consistent with Propositions 1-4.
We next let  = 3 in Panel C. This implies stronger marketization, and a doubling in the
predicted change in female market hours f , accompanied by a rise - as opposed to a fall -
in male market hours m: Stronger marketization now dominates structural transformation,
and as a result even men work more in the market. Despite this, the model explains 15 extra
percentage points of the rise in f=m:
We next consider an alternative value for the productivity growth di¤erential between
market and home services s   h = 0:4%, which is the value used by Ngai and Pissarides
(2008). This delivers an improvement in the male service share and male market hours
(sm; m) ; due to weaker marketization. But clearly the predictions for
 
s; sf ; f ; f=m

deteriorate.
5 Conclusion
The rise in female participation to the workforce is one of the main labor market changes
of the post-war period, and has been reected in a large and growing body of work on
the factors underlying such change. The bulk of the existing literature has emphasized
gender-specic factors such as human capital accumulation, medical advances, gender-biased
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technical change, cultural change, and antidiscrimination interventions, which imply a rise
in the female intensity across the whole industry structure. This paper complements existing
work by proposing a gender-neutral mechanism that boosts female employment and wages
by expanding the sector of the economy in which women have a comparative advantage.
In our proposed model, marketization and structural transformation, in turn driven by
changes in relative prices of sectoral output, jointly act as a demand shock, generating a
simultaneous increase in both womens relative wages and market hours. While the source of
both forces is gender neutral, their combination has female friendly outcomes. Marketization
draws womens time into the market and structural transformation creates the jobs that
women are better suited for in the market. These outcomes are consistent with evidence on
gender convergence in wages, market work, and household work. When calibrated to the
U.S. economy, our model adequately predicts the rise in services and it explains about a half
of the rise in womens market hours and 20% of the rise in the wage ratio.
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6 Appendix
6.1 The Model
6.1.1 Uniqueness of equilibrium
Lemma 5 Any equilibrium wage ratio x 2 [x1; x2] ; where xj  1aj

Lm
Lf
1=
; j = 1; 2:
Proof. Any equilibrium x must imply Lf1=Lf 2 [0; 1] : Using the equilibrium condition
(6), it requires a1 6 x Lm=Lf 6 a2; and the result follows.
Lemma 6 For any x 2 [x1; x2], T (x1) > D (x) > T (x2) ; thus equilibrium x exists.
Proof. Note T (x1) = 1 and T (x2) = 0; but for any x 2 [x1; x2] ; 0 < D (x) < 1; and the
result follows.
Lemma 7 For any equilibrium x; D0 (x) > T 0 (x) :
Proof. From (6):
T 0 (x) =  x
  1
a1   a2

Lm
Lf

< 0
From (17):
D0 (x) =
R0 (x)
[1 +R (x)]2
;
R0 (x)
R (x)
=   (   ") (a1   a2)x
 2
(1 + a2x 1) (1 + a1x 1)
and D0 (x) R 0 for  S ": Together they imply:
D0 (x)  T 0 (x) =   R (x)
[1 +R (x)]2
R0 (x)
R (x)
+
x  1
a1   a2

Lm
Lf

=
x  1
a1   a2

Lm
Lf

 +
xR0 (x)
R (x) [1 +R (x)]

  a2
a1   a2
R0 (x)
R (x) [1 +R (x)]
: (38)
The second term in (38) is positive, and the term in square bracket is:
 +
xR0 (x)
R (x) [1 +R (x)]
=

1 +R (x)

2a2x
 1 + 1 + a2x 1a1x 1
(1 + a2x 1) (1 + a1x 1)
+R (x)

+
" (a1   a2)x 1
(1 + a2x 1) (1 + a1x 1) [1 +R (x)]
> 0
for any x = x:
Proposition 8 Equilibrium x is unique.
Proof. For any x 2 [x1; x2] ; T 0 (:) < 0: If  6 "; D0 (:) > 0, and x is unique. If  > ",
D0 (:) < 0. There in an odd number of equilibria, and at least one of them must imply
T 0 (x) > D0 (x), which contradicts Lemma 7.
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6.1.2 Aggregation across market and home
The production function (10) can be rewritten as
cj = AjLfj
"
2 + (1  2)

Lmj
Lfj
  1

# 
 1
j = s; h;
which implies
cs
ch
=
As
Ah
Lfs
Lfh
=

 As
(1   )Ah

;
where the second equality follows from (13). Substituting into (9) and using (13) yields
c2 = cs
"
 + (1   )

 As
(1   )Ah
1 #  1
= cs

 
1 +Rmh
Rmh
 
 1
: (39)
Combining (10), (12) and (13) yields:
cs = As
"
2

Rmh
1 +Rmh
Lf2
  1

+ (1  2)

Rmh
1 +Rmh
Lm2
  1

# 
 1
;
which can be substituted into (39) to obtain A2 :
A2 = As
Rmh
1 +Rmh

 
1 +Rmh
Rmh
 
 1
= As 

 1

Rmh
1 +Rmh
  1
 1
: (40)
The results for 2 follow from taking the time derivative of (40) and using (13).
6.2 Calibration and Computation
6.2.1 Baseline Parameters
Below we give detailed steps to match
 
sf ; sm; f ; m; s; x

in 2005-09. Data on the time
allocation by gender
 
sf ; sm; f ; m

correspond to the models variables Lgj=Lg for g = m; f :
Lgj
Lg
=
8<:
g (1  sg) for j = 1
gsg for j = s
1  g for j = h
9=; : (41)
The ratio Lf=Lm is set to match the observed service share s as follows. By denition,
s =
Lms+Lfs
Lm1+Lf1+Lms+Lfs
; which can be rewritten as
1
s
= 1 +
Lm1
Lm
Lf
Lfs
Lm
Lf
+
Lf1
Lfs
Lms
Lm
Lf
Lfs
Lm
Lf
+ 1
:
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Using (41) yields
Lf
Lm
=
1 sm
sm
  1 s
s
1 s
s
  1 sf
sf
msm
sff
: (42)
Using the observed wage ratio x and hours ratio Lfi=Lmi,20 we obtain j from equilibrium
condition (5).
Finally, the (transformed) relative productivities A^1;s and A^s;h, dened in (36), are pinned
down by data on time allocation (Lfj; Lmj)j=1;s;h and the wage ratio x:We rst compute the
female wage bill shares and relative expenditures across sectors:
Ij  wfLfj
pjcj
=
Lfj
Lfj +
wm
wf
Lmj
; Ejk =
Lfj
Lfk
pjcj
wfLfj
wfLfk
pkck
=
Lfj
Lfk
Ik
Ij
:
Using the obtained j and data on (Lfj; Lmj), we obtain
zj (x) =
Lj
Lfj
=
 
j +
 
1  j
Lmj
Lfj
  1

! 
 1
: (43)
Combining (43) and (28) gives:
Akpk
Ajpj
=
j (zj (x))
1=
k (zk (x))
1=
: (44)
The marketization equation (30) implies
Es;h =

ps
ph
1  
 
1   

=

Asps
Ahph
1  
Ah
As
1  
 
1   

;
which, together with (44), solves for A^s;h. Similarly the structural transformation equation
(31) implies
E1;s =

!
1  !
"
 
 "
 1

ps
p1
1 "
M ; M 
"
1 +

1   
 
 
ps
ph
 1# " 1
=

1 +
1
Es;h
 "
 1
;
which, together with (44), solves for A^1;s: Note that the growth rate of A^jk is simply j   k
for any sector j = 1; s; h:
20Note that the gender hours ratio in each of the three sectors is related to
 
sf ; sm; f ; m

and the
obtained level of Lf=Lm according to:
Lfj
Lmj
=
8><>:
1 sf
1 sm
f
m
Lf
Lm
for j = 1
sf
sm
f
m
Lf
Lm
for j = s
1 f
1 m
Lf
Lm
for j = h
9>=>; :
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics on 17 industries, 1968-2009. 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  1968 2009 Change  1968 2009 Change 
Primary sector  6.2 3.2 -3.0  10.0 17.1 7.1 
Construction  5.8 6.8 1.0  4.7 10.1 5.4 
Manufacturing  29.6 11.6 -18.0  23.7 28.2 4.5 
Utilities  1.7 1.4 -0.3  9.6 17.3 7.7 
All goods  43.3 23.0 -20.3  18.7 20.7 2.0 
Transportation  4.3 3.5 -0.8  9.2 20.2 11.0 
Post and Telecoms  1.3 0.9 -0.4  48.4 36.9 -11.5 
Wholesale trade  3.7 3.0 -0.7  16.1 26.2 10.1 
Retail trade  14.2 15.3 1.1  36.3 46.3 10.0 
FIRE  4.8 7.1 2.3  41.3 55.2 13.9 
Business and repair services  3.1 8.6 5.5  18.9 36.3 17.4 
Personal services  4.1 2.7 -1.4  64.6 71.3 6.7 
Entertainment  0.9 2.2 1.3  24.7 40.3 15.6 
Health  4.8 10.7 5.9  65.8 77.5 11.7 
Education  7.1 10.8 3.7  57.3 70.7 13.4 
Professional services  1.1 3.3 2.2  25.7 42.0 16.3 
Welfare and no-profit  1.3 2.8 1.5  38.8 65.1 26.3 
Public administration  6.1 6.3 0.2  26.8 43.9 17.1 
All services  56.7 77.0 20.3  38.5 52.7 14.2 
 
Notes. Figures reported are shares of annual hours (×100). The primary sector includes agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and 
extraction. Source: CPS. 
 
 
Table 2 
Alternative decompositions of the rise in the female hours share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Row 1 corresponds to the left-hand side of equation (1) in the text. Percentages in rows 2-4 are obtained as ratios between 
the first term on the right-hand side of equation (1) and the left-hand side. The percentage in row 5 is obtained as the ratio between 
the second term on the right-hand side in equation (2) and the left-hand side. 
  
1 Total change (×100) 45.3 – 29.9 = 15.4 
2 Between sector, % of total change (goods/services) 34.0 
3 Between sector, % of total change (17 categories) 34.0 
4 Between occupation, % of total change (4 categories) 26.1 
5 Between occupation, % of within-sector component (4 occupations, 2 sectors) 6.4 
 
Table 3  
Data Targets 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Baseline results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. All parameter values are baseline values, unless otherwise indicated. The % explained are obtained as 100 ൈ ௭೟ି௭೟షభ
௭೟ି௭̂೟షభ
, where ݖ denotes the target variable, ݐ denotes 2005-09, ݐ െ 1 
denotes 1968-72, and a superscript hat indicates model (backward) predictions. 
 
  
Time  ݔ ݏ ݏ௙ ݏ௠  ߤ௙ ߤ௠ ߤ௙/ߤ௠ 
1968-72  0.64 0.58 0.75 0.51  0.36 0.78 0.46 
2005-09  0.77 0.75 0.88 0.65  0.46 0.68 0.67 
Source  CPS  Time use surveys 
      Service 
share 
(Total) 
Service 
share 
(Women) 
Service 
share 
(Men) 
Market 
hours 
(Women) 
Market 
hours 
(Men) 
Market 
hours 
(Women/ 
Men) 
Wage ratio 
(adjusted) 
         ݏ ݏ௙ ݏ௠ ߤ௙ ߤ௠ ߤ௙/ߤ௠ ݔ 
         1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
data 2005-09 0.751 0.882 0.646 0.460 0.683 0.672 0.775 
  data 1968-72 0.582 0.749 0.507 0.355 0.776 0.458 0.641 
A: Baseline model 1968-72 0.583 0.771 0.450 0.411 0.689 0.596 0.748 
Structural transformation and marketization % explained 99 83 141 46 7 36 20 
B: Marketization only model 1968-72 0.686 0.845 0.571 0.388 0.636 0.610 0.779 
ߛଵ െ ߛ௦ ൌ 0 % explained 38 28 54 69 -52 29 -3 
C: Structural transformation only model 1968-72 0.659 0.823 0.531 0.478 0.725 0.659 0.748 
ߛ௦ െ ߛ௛ ൌ 0 % explained 54 45 83 -18 45 6 20 
Table 5: Gender-specific shocks 
 
 
      Service 
share 
(Total) 
Service 
share 
(Women) 
Service 
share 
(Men) 
Market 
hours 
(Women) 
Market 
hours 
(Men) 
Market 
hours 
(Women/ 
Men) 
Wage ratio 
(adjusted) 
Wage ratio 
(raw) 
         ݏ ݏ௙ ݏ௠ ߤ௙ ߤ௠ ߤ௙/ߤ௠ ݔ   
      1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
data 2005-09 0.751 0.882 0.646 0.460 0.683 0.672 0.775 0.805 
  data 1968-72 0.582 0.749 0.507 0.355 0.776 0.458 0.641 0.632 
A: Baseline model 1968-72 0.583 0.771 0.450 0.411 0.689 0.596 0.748 
  % explained 99 83 141 46 7 36 20 
B: Relative supply shifts model 1968-72 0.583 0.766 0.444 0.413 0.693 0.596 0.729 
ܮ௙/ܮ௠ falls at 0.18% per year % explained 100 87 146 44 11 36 34 
C: Gender-biased demand shift model 1968-72 0.585 0.788 0.475 0.333 0.731 0.455 0.684 
ߦ௜/ሺ1 െ ߦ௜ሻ	grows at 0.5% per year, ݅ ൌ 1, ݏ. % explained 98 71 123 122 51 101 68 
D1: Human capital accumulation model 1968-72 0.587 0.774 0.454 0.410 0.687 0.596 0.757 
Human capital useful in all sectors % explained 97 81 138 48 4 36 28 
D2: Human capital accumulation model 1968-72 0.531 0.734 0.402 0.365 0.679 0.537 0.766 
Human capital only useful in the market % explained 130 111 175 91 -4 63 23 
 
See notes to Table 4.  
 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis 
 
 
      Service 
share 
(Total) 
Service 
share 
(Women) 
Service 
share 
(Men) 
Market 
hours 
(Women) 
Market 
hours 
(Men) 
Market 
hours 
(Women/ 
Men) 
Wage 
ratio 
(adjusted) 
         ݏ  ݏ௙ ݏ௠ ߤ௙ ߤ௠ ߤ௙/ߤ௠ ݔ 
         1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
data 2005-09 0.751 0.882 0.646 0.460 0.683 0.672 0.775 
  data 1968-72 0.582 0.749 0.507 0.355 0.776 0.458 0.641 
A: Baseline model 1968-72 0.583 0.771 0.450 0.411 0.689 0.596 0.748 
  % explained 99 83 141 46 7 36 20 
B: Higher elasticity of substitution, male vs female model 1968-72 0.585 0.772 0.452 0.413 0.691 0.598 0.766 
ߟ ൌ 10 % explained 98 83 140 45 8 35 6 
C: Higher elasticity of substitution, goods vs services model 1968-72 0.598 0.782 0.467 0.407 0.682 0.598 0.752 
ߝ ൌ 0.1 % explained 91 75 129 50 -2 35 17 
D: Higher elasticity of substitution, home vs market services model 1968-72 0.555 0.751 0.424 0.373 0.663 0.564 0.753 
ߪ ൌ 3 % explained 116 98 160 83 -22 51 16 
E: Lower productivity growth difference, home vs market services model 1968-72 0.618 0.796 0.486 0.439 0.704 0.623 0.748 
ߛ௦ െ ߛ௛ ൌ 0.4% % explained 79 65 115 20 22 23 20 
 
See notes to Table 4. 
  
 Figure 1  
Trends in market hours, by gender. 
 
Notes. See Table 1 for definition of the service sector. Source: CPS: 1968-2009. 
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Figure 2 
 The gender wage ratio 
 
 
Notes. In panel A the wage ratio is obtained as (the exp of) the coefficient on the female dummy from yearly log wage regressions that only control for gender. In panel B the wage ratio is 
obtained from corresponding regressions that also control for age, age squared, education (4 categories) and ethnicity (one non-white dummy).  Source: CPS: 1968-2009. 
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 Figure 3  
Trends in market work and home production  
(usual weekly hours) 
 
 
Notes. Market work includes includes time spent working in the market sector on main jobs, second jobs, and overtime, including any time spent working at home, but excluding commuting 
time. Home production hours include: time spent on meal preparation and cleanup, doing laundry, ironing, dusting, vacuuming, indoor and outdoor cleaning, design, maintenance, vehicle 
repair, gardening, and pet care; time spent obtaining goods and services; child care. Source: 1965-1966 America's Use of Time; 1975-1976 Time Use in Economics and Social Accounts; 1985 
Americans' Use of Time; 1992-1994 National Human Activity Pattern Survey; 2003-2009 American Time Use Surveys. 
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Figure 4  
The equilibrium wage ratio  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ܶሺݔሻ and ܦሺݔሻ relationships represent conditions (6) and (17), respectively, for ߟ ൐ ߝ. 
 
  
ݔ
ܶሺݔሻ
ܮ௙ଵ/ܮ௙
ܦሺݔሻ
Appendix Tables and Figures 
Figure A1. Trends in market hours, by skill 
   
   
 Notes. The low-skilled include high-school dropouts and high-school graduates. The high-skilled include those with some college, or college completed. Source: CPS: 1968-2009.
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Figure A2 
Trends in market work and home production, by skill. 
(usual weekly hours) 
 
 
Notes. The low-skilled include high-school dropouts and high-school graduates. The high-skilled include those with some college, or college completed. See notes to Figure 3 for definitions of 
market and home hours and source. 
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